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SSO’s	Utopian	Promise	Is	Based	on	Flawed	Assumptions
Heather N. Shipman, Cornell University Library, Heather .shipman @cornell .edu
Abstract
Single‐ sign‐ on authentication (SSO) for licensed library e‐ resources is growing in popularity, touted as a valuable 
tool supporting the personalization of user experiences while maintaining user privacy. Such proposals, how-
ever, are based on assumptions that are not well supported by evidence. This paper addresses three such flawed 
assumptions: that SSO assures privacy; that all authorized patrons have SSO credentials; and that personalization is 
desirable to libraries and their patrons. In reality, privacy is merely one possible SSO configuration, not a guarantee; 
walk‐ in library patrons do not have SSO credentials; and there is a growing body of evidence that existing person-
alization algorithms, and the data collection practices that feed them, cause great harm to users and to society. 
In this paper, I present Cornell University Library’s experiences and concerns surrounding these particular issues, 
which lead us to oppose SSO authentication for our licensed e‐ resources unless certain conditions are met.
Context
This paper reflects a portion of the Charleston 2018 
presentation “Authentication, Identity Management, 
Privacy and Personalization: How Can Libraries Strike 
the Right Balance and Avoid the Growing Dystopian 
Dangers?” The panel, which addressed various issues 
associated with this broader topic, consisted of Kari 
Paulson, Molly Rainard, Steven Harris, Heather Ship-
man, and Josh Howlett. In my portion, I addressed 
the “dystopian dangers” posed by single‐ sign‐ on 
(SSO) authentication, in which a library patron signs 
into an external online service by logging in to their 
library’s institutional account; the institution then 
sends data about the patron to the service pro-
vider to verify that the patron is entitled to use the 
service.
We used the word “dystopia” in our title, description, 
and during our presentation; Kari observed that its 
purpose is to draw attention to the severity of the 
problem. However, the word itself comes from phi-
losophy and fiction; it implies a situation so extreme 
that it’s difficult to believe that it could become real-
ity. Because the dangers inherent in exposure and 
collection of user data are a reality, I’ve chosen to 
turn the burdens of disbelief and proof around: SSO 
has been proposed as a utopian solution to a variety 
of problems, but the evidence shows that it has, thus 
far, failed to prove that it works as promised.
Contemporary culture frequently describes a dysto-
pia as a utopia gone wrong: assumptions on which 
the utopia were built contained fatal flaws. In this 
panel and paper, I outline the three most egregious 
flawed assumptions inherent in SSO proposals.
Assumption	#1:	SSO	Is	Anonymous1
It’s true that SSO can be configured to preserve 
user anonymity. It is not, however, the only possible 
configuration, nor is it the default. At many institu-
tions, the SSO configuration is not under the direct 
control of the library, limiting our ability to protect 
our patrons’ data.
Such is the case at Cornell University Library (CUL): 
Cornell University’s central IT department (CIT) 
uses Shibboleth as its SSO implementation for the 
entire campus and is responsible for its configura-
tion. Because the library world’s discussion of SSO 
assumed and promoted the benefits of its anonym-
ity, CUL didn’t closely examine CIT’s configuration.
We discovered our mistake mid‐ 2016, when I down-
loaded a detailed non‐ COUNTER usage report from 
the ProQuest Ebook Central (PQEC) platform and 
discovered that title‐ and session‐ level information 
was associated with usernames, and the usernames 
were our personally identifiable university netIDs. 
There are two major problems that led to this 
scenario.
First: PQEC shouldn’t have been collecting usage 
data at this level.
Our discussion of this issue with ProQuest branched 
out into further discussion of libraries’ concerns and 
practices regarding patron privacy, and ProQuest has 
taken our strongly worded opinions under advise-
ment. ProQuest’s data collection practices have 
since changed with the introduction of the European 
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
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We continue to work with ProQuest on these issues; 
this panel—organized by ProQuest’s Kari Paulson—
is a part of that work. The dangers of widespread 
patron data dissemination and collection cannot be 
addressed by merely creating a mutual understand-
ing between CUL and ProQuest. No one can solve 
this alone.
Second: Cornell’s SSO configuration exposed 
personally identifiable information. 
Cornell is a member of the InCommon federation, 
a centralized service facilitating the transfer of SSO 
data between participating identity providers and 
service providers. Cornell’s membership in InCom-
mon predates the library’s use of SSO authentication; 
the identity data that Cornell sends to InCommon is 
the data any member service provider would receive 
by default. CIT has configured it such that personally 
identifiable information (PII) (such as name, netID, 
and e‐ mail address) are provided to InCommon.
This is great for research collaboratives who use 
InCommon to facilitate communication between 
collaborators across the world, but it’s disastrous for 
the preservation of library patron privacy. CUL has 
a good working relationship with CIT—a luxury not 
enjoyed between every library and their IT depart-
ment, unfortunately—and so, moving forward, we’re 
working with them to address this issue:
• We judge IP authentication to be far less 
problematic than SSO, and are avoiding SSO 
implementations.
• We have cancelled a subscription whose 
platform replaced IP authentication with an 
SSO authentication more invasive than we 
were willing to accept.
• When a newly added, much needed e‐ re-
source requires SSO, we’re working with CIT 
to write an overriding SSO configuration for 
that e‐ resource to release as little patron 
data as possible.
• We’re launching a broader CUL investigation 
into privacy issues at large, with intent to 
craft a more comprehensive privacy policy, 
as well as tools and workflows to support it.
Ideally, we want the default SSO authentication 
configuration to submit the smallest amount of data 
possible, but because the current configuration 
has been in use for a very long time and is used by 
a large number of service providers, retroactive 
cleanup will be extensive and must be conducted 
carefully to avoid breaking many authentication pro-
cesses simultaneously. Additionally, the responsibility 
for this project would lie entirely within CIT, not CUL, 
and thus initiating it will require building significant 
political will at the highest levels of both CUL and CIT. 




For SSO to function, a library patron must enter their 
institutional username and password. However, 
not all authorized patrons have such a login—nor 
should they need one. Walk‐ in patrons should not be 
expected to create an account in order to use library 
e‐ resources onsite; this is an especially critical issue 
for public libraries that serve entire communities. In 
many cases, library funding may include a require-
ment to provide such access.
Cornell University is a hybrid public/private univer-
sity; although some of our colleges are endowed, 
others are state‐ funded and associated with the 
State University of New York (SUNY) system. SUNY 
policy states that “the public is given access to Uni-
versity libraries insofar as possible.”2 CUL requests 
walk‐ in access for licensed e‐ resources in all license 
negotiations, largely successfully.
Theoretically, SSO services like Shibboleth can sup-
port walk‐ in access, but this is far more complicated 
to implement than on‐ campus IP authentication is. 
Furthermore, CUL is not aware of any example of 
successful SSO implementation with viable walk‐ in 
access. We have, however, seen discussion of prob-
lematic implementations via the ERIL‐ L mailing list.
Assumption	#3:	Libraries	and	Their	Patrons	
Want	Personalization
“Personalization” comes at the price of data col-
lection, and libraries are widely believed to be one 
of the last institutions still protecting user privacy;3 
active defense of patron privacy is part of the library 
mission, even including defense against our own 
governments.4
Regarding data collection practices, Cornell has more 
questions than answers, and at the forefront of them 
all, we ask: what happens to the data? There is an 
extreme lack of transparency on this front.
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Sometimes this is because an organization doesn’t 
have the infrastructure in place to communicate this 
information effectively. CUL’s initial efforts to inves-
tigate our SSO data leaks were hampered merely by 
no one—CUL or external—knowing who the right 
person to ask was, and staff turnover compounds 
that problem. Continuing investigations are also 
often hampered by the lack of a common vocab-
ulary between programmers, privacy advocates, 
product managers, and other stakeholders. We have 
made inroads on this problem, but it is far from 
solved, and remains a major issue across the library 
e‐ resource industry.
But sometimes the lack of transparency is deliberate. 
It should go without saying that this is unacceptable.
Furthermore, the precedents for personalization 
proposals are appalling: companies like Google, 
Facebook, and Amazon are making money hand 
over fist by using Big Data and AI to “personal-
ize” their platforms, but there is a growing body 
of evidence that these algorithms are doing very 
bad things.
In her book Algorithms of Oppression, Safiya Noble 
argues that search engine algorithms reinforce 
and amplify existing racist and sexist prejudices, 
while simultaneously presenting an air of neutrality 
because a computer chose the results.
In the keynote sessions of the 2018 ER&L confer-
ence,5 Robyn Caplan, danah boyd, and Siva Vaidhya-
nathan discuss ways in which Big Data, social media, 
and other algorithms are impacting our entire cul-
ture—not, generally, in good ways. Vaidhyanathan, in 
particular, focuses on ways in which they’re actively 
undermining democracy.
Facebook has run unethical research studies on its 
users;6 Amazon built (and later scrapped) a recruiting 
tool that showed bias against women;7 Target was 
able to identify a pregnant teen and, through their 
targeted advertising, disclosed this to her family;8 
data breaches are rampant.9
Humans have been working on personalization algo-
rithms for years, and these are the results. This is our 
proof of concept; this is the precedent some service 
providers are eager to follow.
Cornell University Library seeks to avoid sacrific-
ing patron privacy to personalization proposals.10 
We desire proof that the data is being handled in 
responsible and ethical ways, and so far, we have 
seen no such proof. 
What	Would	Make	SSO	Palatable?
Under what circumstances would CUL reconsider 
our opinion of SSO authentication? First, all of the 
aforementioned problems would need to be solved. 
We desire the following:
• Patron anonymity should be the default, 
and it should be difficult to expose PII by 
accident.
• Walk‐ in patrons should be able to use library 
e‐ resources without being asked for a login.
• Service providers should be transparent 
with regard to which fields of data are being 
collected, what they’re being used for, and 
how long they’re stored.
• Contact information for those responsible 
for these practices should be easy to find 
and use.
• Service providers should be willing to work 
with libraries toward mutually acceptable 
data collection and retention practices.
Once the above issues are solved, we would be more 
willing to consider limited personalization protocols, 
under the following conditions:
• Patrons should still be able to use the ser-
vice without revealing PII.
• Personalization should only be enabled by 
the patron’s request.
• Patrons should be able to choose the 
level of personalization they desire and be 
properly informed as to what data would 
be collected to enable each personalization 
function.
• Data use should be ethical.
Under no circumstances should the library e‐ re-
sources industry emulate Google, Facebook, and 
other companies collecting and mining user data to 
benefit their revenue streams, to the detriment of 
the user’s privacy. In fact, given the importance of 
privacy to the library brand, we believe that library 
e‐ resource vendors actively protecting patron privacy 
could have a significant advantage in the market-
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